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 Free will is an oft disputed topic in popular culture, religion, and philosophy, yet much of its 
refutations are built upon theories of determinism and necessitation, whose conclusions are 
untenable. Any discussion of free will is necessarily a discussion of cause and effect, so any claims 
made about freedom must first establish what it is to be a free agent. This thesis challenges 
deterministic causation, showing that even classical Newtonian mechanics gives us indeterminate 
solutions. In doing this, we show that causation itself is a fundamental truth, built from an ontology 
of causal powers, the implications of which we explore in detail. From this metaphysical 
framework we explore a plausible route by which free will may emerge: the theory of Agent 
Causation, which argues that at the core of every free action is an irreducible causal relation 
between a person and some appropriate mental or internal event that triggers later elements of the 
action. Agent Causation will be shown to be a theory of causal powers implied by our ontology, 
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The core of any discussion of free will is agency: can I actually be the cause of my actions? To exist 
and function day-to-day requires some level of belief about your own control over your actions. 
You can’t not believe that you are in control of what you yourself do—you may pay lip service to 
the idea of external control, determinism, God, or whatever exterior cause you can create, but the 
very idea of acting, doing, being, and living requires agency. To argue against this idea itself 
requires some kind of doublethink, for to argue is to act and acting requires an actor. The actor 
acts, the dancer dances, the orator orates; to verb is to be something that verbs, to cause is to be a 
causer. This argument can be dismissed as semantic, taking one of  a number of possible routes—
determinism, primary movers, grand design---all of which reach the same conclusion: the 
doublethink is necessary and correct, and free will is a delusion. While we may believe we are in 
control of what we do, this control extends no further than the end of the thought and translates 
not at all to action. Action, to the denier, is irreconcilable with actual agency despite its derivative 
usefulness, so we might as well go on pretending the fallacy. 
Is such fatalism really all that is left to us? Is the question itself even important? To answer, 
we must first define what it is we are talking about when we talk about free will. Free will is a 
power, a power which confers on us both freedom of action and responsibility for that action. 
Whether we believe in it or not, we feel proud of our good acts and guilty for the wrong when we 
feel that we are responsible
1
 for said event. Free will, then, is the power of agents to be the ultimate 
 
1
 For this paper, we will not attempt to answer many ethical questions of the consequences of free will. Many of them 
are obvious, such as the appearance of responsibility mentioned above, but as Galen Strawson points out in Freedom 
and Belief, moral responsibility carries with it a deep sense of true responsibility: we are “truly deserving of praise and 
blame” for it is “truly up to us” (26). I agree with this and leave further discussion to others. 
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creators (or originators) and sustainers of their own ends or purposes
2
. To actively will (or freely 
act) is to be the ‘primary mover’ of one’s own events and purposes. While relatively obscure and 
functionally unfathomable, the notion of one’s ultimate creation of one’s motives and purposes is 
the basis beneath understanding of free will. Imagining a causal chain, we trace the causes or 
explanations of events back to their sources: the purposes of the acting agent. For the free will 
faithful, these chains must terminate in the agent’s willings
3
, which would be the choices, decisions, 
or efforts of the agent.  
For better or worse, we accept moral responsibility for our actions and assume we are to 
the highest degree in control of our own actions. If we have a choice, we are free, and we always 
seem to have a choice. But is that a simple delusion? Determinism and strict physical causation 
appear to imply a complete chain of events throughout space-time; a picture entirely incompatible 
with free will. If the human mind is a completely physical and deterministic system, under pre-
quantum interpretations of matter it was safe to assume the mind was deterministic as well, thereby 
removing free will and reducing human action to being pre-determined and pre-destinated. There 
is thereby a prima facie tension between free will and determinism, often referred to as 
incompatibilism.  
At this point, it may be asked why there is even an issue here between determinism 
(necessitation) and free will. After all, hasn’t modern science moved beyond universal 
determinism? The problem lies not in physics but in all other sciences: developments in biology, 
neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, social and behavioral sciences have all moved towards 
 
2
 This relatively uncontroversial definition and some of the discussion that follows is taken from Robert Kane’s The 
Significance of Free Will. It is used as our definition here because it broadly fits our purposes. 
3
 We will point out later that this is not true in all cases—there are uncaused actions and actions caused by something 
other than the agent—but extreme agency has been argued, albeit unsuccessfully. If these willings were in turn caused 
by something else, i.e. the environment, God, or fate, then ultimacy would lie with something other than the agents. 
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deterministic pictures. Today more than ever, people believe that much more of our behavior is 
determined by far more causes outside of our control and understanding than we previously 
believed (Kane, 2002). Genetics and heredity, gut biomechanics, drugs, and unconscious 
influences on behavior are just a few of the things that modern science claims to dictate our actions 
and beliefs. The mere existence of indeterminism in the world does not suffice to reject the 
determinist’s challenge to free will
4
. 
Free will is inherently an issue of causation and how we fit into it. We will argue that the 
‘never-ending disputation’
5
 should be framed in terms of causation, which must be defined as more 
than a common-sense idea. The emergence of indeterminism, while not a complete rejection, 
challenges our beliefs about causality writ large: the idea of the causal chain is key, for without a 
mechanism of cause and effect there is no agency, so how can there be causation in an 
indeterministic world? Much of the effort at the start will thus be to craft some idea of causation, 
with some surprising results. 
The purpose of this thesis is to build a metaphysical model of the world based on a theory 
of causal powers. An ontological theory of powers, while controversial, must be the basis for our 
discussion of free will for powers are fundamental to agency and freedom. Agents have properties, 
beliefs, desires, and wishes, and it is these properties that do causal work, doing so because they 
are powerful. Events exist as well. Events that are caused will be produced by powers at work. 
Events will be the changes produced when powers exercise themselves. These changes can also 
push other powers together, so when we talk of events in causation, we are mainly talking about 
 
4
 For more on these challenges, see works by Taylor and Dennett, Paul Russel, Richard Double, Benjamin Libet, and 
Henrik Walter. 
5
 This is a reference to the following poem: 
“There is a disputation [that will continue] till mankind are raised from the dead between the Necessitarians 
and the partisans of Free Will” 
 --Jalalu’ddin Rumi, twelfth-century Persian poet 
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These models will be explored in greater depth. While they are discussed, we must keep in 
mind the ultimate goal: free will. Once established in theory, they will be extended to the physical 
world as an approximate theory of Agent Causation, with agents classified as “powerful” beings 
capable of acting, willing, and perceiving change. From this model, which has been established and 
based entirely on prior theoretical work from Anscombe, Aristotle, Marmodoro, Mumford, 
Anjum, and Molnar, we will discuss some theories of free will in the presence of indeterminism 
discussed primarily by Timothy O’Connor. Once each view is established, we will attempt to fit or 
show the inability to fit the theory with the Powerist theory discussed at the beginning of the paper. 
The model with best fit--Timothy O’Connor’s Agent Causation—will be analyzed further, 




 Agent Causation is fundamental to our ontological picture, and how that fits in to the Powerism picture is discussed in 
the final two chapters. 
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Determinism and Necessitation 
Determinism 
To begin, we should describe what is it is we mean by “determinism” in the most general sense. 
For our purposes, we will consider determinism to refer to “nomological” or “causal” determinism, 
or the idea that the facts about our past which we generally consider to be true contain the relevant 
information when coupled with the necessary laws to determine all the facts of our future. 
According to van Inwagen (1974), we can consider determinism to be an entailment: determinism 
is “a relation of entailment that holds between, on the one hand, statements of law and statements 
of particular fact at a time, and, on the other hand, statements of particular fact at other times.”  
 When we discuss determinism, we consider both finite, closed, irreducible actions and the 
state of the entire physical world
7
. By the latter we mean any and all relevant information about the 
universe—a large set, but functionally reducible to our own world for the purposes of our 
refutation. By ‘state’ we may understand a particular set of events at a particular time, frozen and 
locked into place
8
 with no facts about it containing information about future actions (i.e. “Maria will 
turn around in 2 minutes”). Formally, then, we can define determinism as follows: 






 This and the following discussion on determinism relies heavily on Peter van Inwagen’s “The Incompatibility of Free 
Will and Determinism” from 1974  
8
 The notion of “time-slicing” can itself be challenged. Time may be infinitely reducible, which would  entail an 
inability to individuate moments from which we can construct our theories. We will use infinite divisibility later in the 
section on Norton’s Dome 
9
 Arguing that we can reduce the state of the world to a proposition is admittedly rather reductive. Gödel 
Incompleteness implies an inability to know all the facts about any system (including the system of our universe). This 
itself has been used to argue for free will; for more on this, see Feferman, S. 2011. “Gödel’s Incompleteness 
Theorems, Free Will and Mathematical Thought.” In Free Will and Modern Science, edited by Richard Swinburne, 
102–22. New York: Oxford University Press.”  
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(b) If A and B are propositions that express the state of the world at two different times t1 
and t2 such that A precedes B
10
, then the conjunction of A with the laws of physics 
entails B 
In the definition above, it is clear that ‘the laws of physics’ are made to do work. If the laws were 
vague maybes rather than hard code, determinism would be trivially false
11
. What exactly a law of 
physics is supposed to be is unclear, but for our purposes we do not need to settle this question 
here. Rather, we shall argue from as uncontroversial of a position as possible, given we are 
discussing issues of quantum indeterminism and causation, both of which are highly contentious. 
 Of further interest is the Beta principle, which goes as follows: Let "Np" abbreviate "p, and 
nobody has, or ever had, any choice about whether p”, and consider Beta: If Np and N(p ⊃ q), 
then Nq. Beta is the central rule of interference in van Inwagen’s “Consequence Argument” for the 
incompatibility of freedom and determinism
12
. He proposes the case of the judge “who had only to 
raise his right hand at a certain time, T, to prevent the execution of a sentence of death upon a 
certain criminal.” The judge proceeds to refrain from raising his hand at that time, and that this 
inaction resulted in the criminal's being put to death. The judge is said to have decided against 
raising his hand at T “only after a period of calm, rational, and relevant deliberation [in which he 
had] not been subjected to any ‘pressure’ to decide one way or another about the criminal’s 
 
10
 The length of time between A and B is arbitrary. They can occur one after the other directly or be thousands of years 
apart. According to a simplified determinism, in either case A entails B. This of course ignores probabilistic events, but 
determinists may be found to argue that even probabilistic events are only probabilistic when all relevant information is 
unknown. 
11
 Again, this is not necessarily true. There are obvious indeterminism/quantum mechanics challenges to determinism, 
but we can restrict the definition of determinism or cause-effect conjunctions to be derivatively true rather than 
ontologically necessary. See the section on Norton’s Dome for further discussion on the subject.  
12
 See “Counterexamples to Principle Beta: A Response to Crisp and Warfield” by Erik Carlson for more discussion 
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death.” His decision is understood to be perfectly rational, free from influence, and under the 
assumptions of free will entirely his own intellectual product (Van Inwagen, p. 186-191, 1974). 
Informally, he argues that if determinism is true as constructed, then there was never any 
ability for the judge to have raised his hand. In fact the judge had no free will, rational thought, or 
individual intellectual product whatsoever. His decision was made for him but not by another free 
agent but by the entire state of the universe leading to this particular event. Van Inwagen’s formal 
argument proceeds in the following manner: by ‘P0’’ we mean the proposition relating to the state 
of the world at time ‘T0’ which is itself some arbitrary instant of time before the judge’s birth (and 
thereby out of the realm of his influence). ‘P’ denotes the state of the world at T, and ‘L’  the 
conjunction of all laws of physics into a single law
13
. Here is the argument: 
1) If determinism is true, then the conjunction of P0 and L entails P. 
2) If the judge had raised his hand at T, then P would be false. 
3) If (2) is true, then if the judge could have raised his hand at T, the judge could have 
rendered P false. 
4) If the judge could have rendered P  false, and if the conjunction of P0  and L entails 
P, then the judge could have rendered the conjunction of P0 and L false. 
5) If the judge could have rendered the conjunction of P0 and L false, then the judge 
could have rendered L false. 
6) The judge could not have rendered L false. 
7) If determinism is true, the judge could not have raised his hand at T.14 
 
13
 While apparently incompatible on many levels, we may understand the assumption to be a sweeping generalization 
of the “rules of the game” which we all play by and cannot escape from. 
14
 Van Inwagen, Incompatibility, 191. 
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This is the basis from which most arguments for Incompatibilism arise. In short, we can define 
Incompatibilism to be the thesis that there is no world in which determinism and free will can 
coexist. Of note in this definition of determinism is the reliance upon the entailment relation 
between two propositions, the conjunction of P0 and L, and P. This kind of relationship may 
appear to imply that causation itself entails necessitation, which is a misconception. The 
Consequence Argument itself does not mention causation—it is a discussion of determinism, which 
can also be characterized as simply ‘nothing can ever happen otherwise than it does.’ What we 
instead argue is that causation is independent of determinism, meaning that we can reject 
determinism without paying an ontological price. 
In Causality and Determination: An Inaugural Lecture, Anscombe formalizes the idea as 
follows: “Causality is some kind of necessary connexion (sic), or alternatively, being caused is — 
non-trivially — instancing some exceptionless generalization saying that such an event always follows 
such antecedents” (1). Thus, if an effect occurs in one case and another effect occurs in an 
identical version of the case, there must be some further relevant difference. It is a proof by 
contradiction: if we assume that the judge did raise his hand instead of leaving it down, then given 
the deterministic laws of necessitation and causation, there must have been some difference in 
circumstance between the two cases. However, the two cases are identical, and therefore the judge 
could not have raised his hand
15
. Deterministic causation and free will can thereby not coexist. 
 
15
 Interestingly, Robert Kane’s picture of the free mind does not appear to require many of the commitments we will 
discuss about causation, rather relying on the indeterministic system of a spinning self-network of will. In fact, the 
circumstances could be exactly the same as established and the judge could make a different decision—we just need a 
different understanding of the “laws of physics”  
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The necessitation relation of cause and effect has been argued for centuries. The 
conception of their constant conjunction is often ascribed to Hume,
16
 who argued that the relation 
between cause and effect “could not be found in the situation, objects, or events called ‘causes’ or 
‘effects’ but was to be found in the human’s mind being determined, by experience of constant 
conjunction” (Anscombe, p. 4). The constant conjunction view is reinforced by Thomas Hobbes, 
who argued for a type of simultaneous necessitation in Elements of Philosophy: 
“A cause simply, or an entire cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents both of the agents 
how many soever (sic) they be, and of the patients, put together, which when they are 
supposed to be present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the same 




Kant continued this tradition by establishing causation as an a priori conception. Instead of the 
instantaneous manifestation of effect and cause, he argues for an objective time order arising in 
conformity with classical consequent/precedent conceptions: from the conditions of the precedent 
event/state necessarily arises the consequent event.  
Necessity and Sufficiency 
Before proceeding with this discussion on causation, it would prove useful to provide a stricter 
definition of necessity. While there are a number of difficulties
18
 for the so-called “Standard 
Theory” of necessity and sufficiency, we will only treat such ideas as derivatively true and will 
 
16
 In Strawson’s David Hume: Objects and Power, he argues against the idea that Hume holds a “straightforward 
‘regularity’ theory of causation, according to which causation is nothing more than the regular succession or constant 
conjunction.” Instead, Strawson claims that Hume believes in what he calls “causal power” or “natural necessity,” the 
claim that all we can ever actually observe is regular succession, which is not to say that all causation actually is is the 
constant conjunction of objects. For more, read his excellent piece.  
17
 Interestingly, this simultaneous mutual manifestation is going to be used heavily by the Powerists we discuss later. In 
their context, powers manifest their effects at the instant of mutual manifestation.  
18
 For further discussion, see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/necessary-sufficient/  
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thereby attempt to avoid potential problem areas such as ambiguity
19
. The standard theory
20
 of 
necessity relies upon a truth-functional definition of the proposition if. In classical logic, the 
statement ‘If p then q’ (p ⊃ q) is only false in the case when p is true and q is false. If the 
conditional holds, and p is true, then q must also be true. In the common understanding, the truth 
of q (the consequent) is necessary for the truth of p (the antecedent) while the truth of the 
antecedent is merely sufficient for the truth of the consequent. In the case of van Inwagen’s judge, 
the birth is necessary for the judge’s raising his hand.  
 In classic ‘material’ or truth-functional conditionals, there is a reciprocity between necessity 
and sufficiency. Consider the following conditional: “If you are a human, you have a heart.” With 
weird problem cases and artificial hearts excluded, we can consider the consequent, having a heart, 
to be necessary for the truth of the antecedent, being human. Conversely, being human is merely a 
sufficient condition for having a heart; after all, plenty of other animals have hearts too. Necessity 
can also be identified using an “only if” clause: in the case of the judge, he can raise his hand only 
if he was born (and determinism is false). There is thus a fundamental link between ideas of 
necessity and determinism, so for us to escape we must take a different route. 
Causation  
Let us consider now what it is we mean by causation. As we have mentioned, the common 
assumption about causation lies in necessitation within the cause-effect relation; that there is a non-
trivial generalization to be made about effects being derived from causes. Of important note here is 
that just because something is said to be a cause of an effect—like a virus being the cause of a 
 
19
 Namely, we operate under the assumption that necessity and sufficiency are not ontological truths, or that modal-
ontological dependence is not true. This is a claim that needs further defense. For more on the topic, see works by 
Rosen, Marcus, or Fine.  
20
 This analysis of truth-functional logic primarily follows Humean analysis. There are a number of different ways to do 
this, but for our purposes this analysis is sufficient and simple. 
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disease—does not mean that such causes always necessitate their effect. The case of the disease is a 
clear one: you do not always get sick when you are around someone who is also sick for a variety of 
reasons, one of which being your body is able to resist.  
 How, then, are we do define causality? At its most basic level, causality consists in the 
derivativeness of an effect from whatever its causes may be. To say effects arise from causes is not 
controversial, at least in this understanding of temporal procession. Anscombe argues that we 
should be able to “derive knowledge of the effect from knowledge of the cause, or vice versa, but 
that does not shew (sic) us the cause as the source of the effect.” In other words, she is arguing that 
causation is not to be associated with necessitation in all cases
21
. Put formally: 
“If A comes from B, this does not imply that every A-like thing comes from some B-like 
thing or set-up has an A-like thing coming from it; or that given B, A has to come from it, 
or that given A, there has to be B for it to come from. Any of these may be true, but if any 
is, that will be an additional fact, not comprised in A’s coming from B. If we take ‘coming 
from’ in the sense of travel, this is perfectly evident” (Anscombe 8). 
So, then, causation is not to be inextricably linked with necessitation. This gives rise to an 
important question: is causation ever to be associated with necessitation? To answer, we must 
undertake in something slightly painful: mathematics, which we will use as an alternate but 




 We will show later with Norton’s Dome that the necessitation relation can be functionally removed from our 





In a 2003 article published in Philosophers’ Imprint  titled “Causation as Folk Science,” John D. 
Norton argued against the “common sense” conception of causation. The widely held principle of 
causality asserts every effect is causally necessitated by a cause and such causal conjunctions rule 
the world around us, a stance that Norton takes issue with. He posits both a negative and a positive 
thesis as new models of how we think of causation. In the negative thesis, Norton urges that “the 
concepts of cause and effect are not the fundamental concepts of our science and that science is 
not governed by a law or principle of causality” (Norton 1). This causal skepticism is taken in the 
light of our most mature scientific theories and is motivated by the introduction of possibility into 
causal models. In the positive thesis, Norton argues that “ordinary scientific theories can conform 
to a folk science of causation when they are restricted to appropriate, hospitable processes; and the 
way they do this exploits the generative power of reductive relations, a power usually used to 
recover older theories from newer ones” (Norton 2).  
The “generative power” he describes here is in reference to a common move over the 
course of scientific progress: recovering older theoretical models of the world and universe that 
have been found lacking in some area. For example, Norton points out the utility of treating gravity 
as a force as claimed by Newton despite Einstein’s theory of general relativity as well as the 
treatment of heat as a conserved fluid. This reductive view can be enormously convenient, as many 
of the problem cases for such reductions are not applicable in everyday situations. So too 
causation: “causes and causal principle are recovered from science in the same way and have the 
same status: they are heuristically useful notions…but we should not mistake them for the 
fundamental principles of nature” (Norton 2). Thus, the two theses, negative or “skeptical” and 
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positive or “constructive” combine to challenge the idea that causation is a physical fact of the 
world that we can recover from our sciences.  
This type of causal skepticism is not unique to Norton. In 1917 Bertrand Russell raised 
similar concerns, dispensing with causes in the following way: 
“All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of those fundamental 
axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in the advanced sciences such as 
gravitation astronomy, the word ‘cause’ never occurs…The law of causality, I believe, like 
much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving like the 
monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.” (Russell 132).
22
 
What Russell and Norton challenge is the notion of causal fundamentalism, the claim that nature 
is governed by cause and effect. It is thereby the duty of the individual sciences (physics, chemistry, 
biology, etc.) to find expressions of causation within their fields. In effect, this is an a priori stance 
on how the world works, similar to the commonly accepted case of energy. A significant section of 
our mature sciences—in particular, physics, chemistry, and biology—deal with the various 
manifestations of energy. The interchange of kinetic and potential energy governs mechanistic 
actions. Field energy, put very simply, is magnetism and electricity, and chemical energy allows us 
to act. Energy appears as heat, work, light, atomic bonds, and so on, spanning many subjects in a 
necessary and central manner. For causal fundamentalism to succeed, it must too appear clearly in 
the various fields.  
 Causal fundamentalism has sometimes been thought to be equivalent to determinism,  a 
position refuted by Anscombe, Norton, and many others. When the pre-existing conditions are 
fixed to the proper degree, under the laws of determinism the future becomes itself fixed and 
 
22
 Russell actually changed his mind on this topic later on, consistently making essential use of notions of cause. The 
quote here is used as an example of widespread skepticism about causation. 
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unchanging. From this arises the classic Laplace Demon, a “calculating intelligence” which has the 
ability, given sufficient knowledge, to determine the entirety of the past and future. Laplace claims 
famously that “we ought then to consider the present state of the universe as the effect of its 
previous state and the cause of that which is to follow” (Laplace, p. 4, 1814).  While the 
existence/possibility of such an intelligence may be emotionally appealing it falls to a number of 
challenges, namely Gödel Incompleteness.
23
 
 This conception of causation toppled quickly with the advent of modern quantum theory. 
Central to quantum theory is entanglement: two particles, once interacted with, can be infinite 
distances apart yet both be affected instantaneously by changes to just one of the pair. Consider the 
case of gravity as well, which has no speed of propagation and can be found to act where it does 
not appear to be present. We thereby have action at a distance, another apparent problem for 
determinism. If the universe is causal in nature, “it must rule out a priori the possibility of action at 




Quantum theory also proffered mere probabilities of occurrence, not necessities. Even a 
perfectly complete model of the universe “cannot determine whether some particular Radium-221 
atom will decay over the next 30 seconds (its half-life); the best we can say is that there is a chance 
of ½ of decay” (Norton 5). Decay is uncaused and non-necessitated, but it can be predicted 
probabilistically. This gives rise to probabilistic causation. However, prediction is not what we are 
 
23
 For more on this, see “Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Free Will and Mathematical Thought” by Solomon 
Feferman  
24
 This paragraph doesn’t apply to interpretations such as Bohmian Mechanics. For an in-depth discussion of the 
subject, see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Bohmian Mechanics. 
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up against. Determinism involves necessitation instead of probability; there are interpretations of 
free will in a probabilistic event space, Robert Kane’s theories most notable among them.  
 The determinist has a response here: theories of quantum mechanics and general relativity 
do violate our common conceptions of causation and determination, yet they do so only in 
extreme cases like the two-slit or gravitation. Determinism, they claim, still stands upright in every 
case applicable to us and our lives. This is not the case. We turn to an ingenious example typically 
referred to as Norton’s Dome, in which a mass at rest in an unchanging surrounding physical 
environment for an indefinite period of time spontaneously and indeterministically begins to move 
in an arbitrary direction. This example will be used to show the failure of even simple Newtonian 






 My supervising professor, Dr. Robert Koons, points out that interestingly, quantum mechanics is more nearly 
deterministic than Newtonian mechanics, in the sense that the Schrödinger dynamics guarantee a unique result in cases 
like this (basically, the ball simultaneously rolls down in all directions, and stays on top, as well). It’s only when a “wave 




The dome pictured on the previous page exists in a downward-directed gravitational field with 
classic gravitational acceleration g.
 26
 The dome has radial coordinate r on its surface and is 
rotationally symmetric around origin 𝑟 = 0, the peak of the dome. The height of the dome is 






The surface of the dome is frictionless so that a point-like unit mass will slide frictionless over the 
surface under gravity, with gravitational force only able to accelerate the mass along the surface. At 





2  and is directed radially outward, resulting in no tangential force at 𝑟 = 0. When on the 
dome, the mass experiences a net outward downward directed force field of magnitude 𝑟
1
2. When 
applied to the mass on the surface, Newton’s Second Law (𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎) sets the radial acceleration 
𝑑(2)𝑟
𝑑(𝑡2)






2 .  
 Let us place the mass at the apex, 𝑟 = 0. If the mass is initially at rest with no force applied, 
there is one clear solution to Newton’s Second Law for all times t:  
(2) 𝑟(𝑡) = 0 
This is rather obvious: the mass, initially at rest, with no outside force or change in its 
circumstances, will remain at rest indefinitely. However, there are alternative solutions. For any 
radial direction, the following is a solution 
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 Image and construction taken from “Causation as Folk Science” by John D. Norton 
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) (𝑡 − 𝑇)4,  𝑡 ≥ 𝑇
0, 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇
  where 𝑇 ≥ 0 is an arbitrarily chosen constant.  







) (𝑡 − 𝑇)2 = [(
1
144
) (𝑡 − 𝑇)4]
1
2





2  with 𝑟 = (
1
144
) (𝑡 − 𝑇)4 
This solution amounts to a violation of the statement above: that it will remain at rest indefinitely. 
The mass will have motion at some indeterminate time, and this motion will be uncaused, 
occurring at time 𝑡 = 𝑇. The physical conditions on the dome are identical to before—symmetric 
in every direction, so the direction the ball goes is arbitrary. 
 Note also that there are no probabilities inherent to the problem here, as probabilities do 
not have much place in Newtonian mechanics. Even if we were to add probabilities for the 
direction of the ball, it would amount to an equal probability to travel in every direction. However, 
there is no way for us to add probabilities for the time T that accurately represents the solution (3), 
as all potential times T are necessarily treated equally. Summed over the infinite number of time 
intervals (0,1), (2,3), (3,4), … we would have 𝑑𝑥 probability assigned to each interval, entailing a 
probability of zero for each one.  
To properly assign probabilities, Norton argues that we would need to graft unnatural 
additional physical properties onto the system. Per Norton: 
“For example, consider the natural condition that, at any time t, we always have the same 
probability of no excitation occurring over the next (arbitrarily chosen but fixed) time interval 
∆t, given that no excitation has occurred by the start of that time interval.  This condition 
uniquely picks out the exponential decay rule 𝑃(𝑡) = exp (−
𝑡
𝜏
) where P(t) is the probability 
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of no excitation over the time interval (0,t) and τ is some positive time constant. At any time 










), which is independent of t as required. The problem is that the dynamics of 
excitation is governed by the magnitude of the time constant τ, which is the mean time to 
excitation.  A small τ means that we likely will have rapid excitation; a large τ means we 
will not. Nothing in the physical setup of the dome and mass enables us to fix a value for τ
.  We must fix its value by arbitrary stipulation, thereby inventing the new physical property 
of rate of decay, which is not inherent in the original physical system.” (Norton 10) 
 Further concerns can then be raised about Newton’s First Law, but reformulating the law in 
the following way is consistent with the solutions found: 
For times t ≤ T, there is no force applied, since the body is at position r=0, the force-free 
apex; and the mass is unaccelerated. 
For times t > T, there is a net force applied, since the body is at positions r>0 not at the apex, 
the only force free point on the dome; and the mass accelerates in accord with F=ma. 
What is clearly crucial to this construction is the time T. The solutions we found in (3) entail the 
following acceleration: 




) (𝑡 − 𝑇)2,  𝑡 ≥ 𝑇
0, 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇
   
Thus at time 𝑡 = 𝑇 the mass is still at 𝑟 = 0 and has acceleration 𝑎(0) = 0. Hence at time 𝑡 = 𝑇 
there is no force and the mass us unaccelerated, but at any subsequent time 𝑡 > 𝑇 there is a non-
zero force and acceleration.  
 Herein lies the crux of the issue: how and when does this acceleration/force occur? The 
natural move is to look for some “first instant” of motion and from there find the cause of the 
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motion at that instant. The equations above seem to imply that there does exist an instant 𝑡 = 𝑇 at 
which the mass moves. This is a misconception and the cause of confusion at first glance. Rather 
time 𝑡 = 𝑇 is the last instant at which the mass does not move. There is no first instant at which the 
mass moves. Motion occurs only over the interval 𝑡 > 𝑇 and this interval has no first instant 
(Norton 11). That is, for any 𝜀 > 0, it is the case that |𝑡 − 𝑇| > 𝜀 for all real numbers t, T with   
𝑡 ≠ 𝑇 . There is no possible first instant candidate which cannot be preceded by an earlier 
candidate. Thus we conclude that there is no first instant of motion and thereby no first instant at 
which to seek the initiating cause. Norton’s move here is sound and is made to avoid a vicious 
infinite regress. As we can allow for indeterministic solutions in a classically deterministic picture, 
the “trigger” being a non-event at an unspecifiable time is not an issue.  
Non-Causal Fundamentalism  
We return now to Norton’s negative thesis of non-causal fundamentalism, or the idea that science 
is not at an ontological level strictly cause and effect. To clarify, this is not to say that cause and 
effect are mere delusions, rather that they are not a necessary part of a modern scientific theory. 
The place of causes in our scientific ontology can be likened to that of superseded theories of 
gravitation or particle physics: gravitation is not a force but a curvature and particles are both 
particle and wave simultaneously, yet in many applications we treat them as if the prior case were 
correct. We continue to exercise the “truths” of the superseded theories in a number of limited 





 Norton further references the material theory of heat (Norton, …and the caloric) here to draw comparisons between 
a defunct theory and a new one. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, heat was conceived of as a conserved 
fluid.  The temperature measured the density of the fluid, and the natural tendency of the fluid to flow from high to 
low density was manifested as a tendency to flow from high to low temperature. The material theory fell apart with the 
introduction of energy conversion into things like work and conduction. As long as the process contained no 
conversions, the treatment of heat as a conserved fluid once again becomes applicable. 
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 Newer, conceptually dense and computationally obtuse theories can be found to have the 
“generative capacity” to recover older, simpler theories. Our general, common sensical daily 
application of cause and effect may not be indicative of deeper ontological truth but in the limited 
circumstances of our lives the white lie is immensely useful. To withhold reality from such entities 
like heat, gravity, and causes because they are not fundamental is to risk an infinite regress: if there 
is no reality to the things we work with if they are not a necessary part of the ontology of our 
mature sciences, can one be confident about the reality of anything at all? The regress here is one 
of meta-powers, or that the powers we work with actually get their reality from a deeper layer we do 
not see, those powers from a layer beneath them, and so on. One way to stop the regress is by 
finding a fundamental layer to stop at, but one must have clear reasons for stopping there. For 
there to be reality under this view, we would need to have confidence that our sciences of today 
will not be surpassed by future sciences that toss out our assumptions as bosh, a confidence which 
we cannot and should not have. 
We rather take the position that such concepts are persistent in our world but do not lay 
claim to the same reality as what is part of our fundamental ontology, whatever that may be. Cause 
and effect are thereby part of a reality built entirely from a fundamental theory of powers. The 
existence of such derivative realities should not be a foreign concept, as much of what we work 
with—schools, books, work, play—are in some way derivative of the more fundamental picture of 
life. This more plastic and less precise model of causality will allow us to build Timothy 
O’Connor’s theory of free will through agent causation later on without having to make strong 
ontological claims as to the nature of reality itself.   
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Toward Causal Powers  
Process  
Up to this point, the bulk of the work has been on the defensive, rejecting the claims of the 
“opposition” and arguing  reductio ad absurdum. We have come to a stage in which the following 
theses have been (hopefully) convincingly argued: 
1. Free Will is not compatible with Determinism 
2. Causation is not to be associated with Necessitation 
3. Deterministic Causation is not ontologically fundamental28 
These have all be negative truths, defining the space around the questions which we are trying to 
answer; namely: 
1. Can Free Will exist in an Indeterministic world? 
2. If cause and effect are not necessities, what are they? Do they exist at all? 
3. What is the ontological truth resting underneath Causation? 
To give some insight into this chapter’s initial divergence from the common thread thus far, we 
should explain the desired outcome. The stated goal is to build a metaphysical model of the world 
based on a theory of powers. Using Molnar’s arguments in Powers, we will discuss why, at a basic 
level, we turn to a theory of powers. This will not involve a deep dive into the minutiae of 
Powerism, but a breakdown of the relevant features will be included. To an extent, we are forced 
to assume the ontological truth of Powerism without justification, as such justification has no room 
 
28
 Norton’s claims concern the non-fundamentality of deterministic causation. If causation is indeterministic in some 
way, it is possible to make the argument that it is, in fact, fundamental, but this does not pose as much of a problem to 
free will as deterministic causation. Indeterministic causation, while not a perfect solution. still leaves the door open for 
possible agent control 
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in this paper. This involves a reliance on realism and its necessary components; the ideas of 
universals and particulars. 
We thus claim that powers are the metaphysical bedrock of reality, and the argument shall flow 
as follows: powers are ontologically dependent on other powers
29
. Powers are monadic properties; 
not a network of polyadic relations. We then move towards a Dispositional theory of powers, 
arguing that in the most general sense, causation is generative behavior of objects that is governed 
by their properties. A disposition or power is something that has possible manifestations though it 
may nevertheless exist unmanifested. This is where our argument commits us to realism, which we 
will not challenge. 
It is properties that do causal work, and they do so because they are powerful (properties will 
be defined as bundles of powers). Events exist as well. Events that are caused will be produced by 
powers at work. Events will be the changes produced when powers exercise themselves. These 
changes can also push other powers together, so when we talk of events in causation, we are mainly 
talking about how the empowered properties got together, and it is these partnered properties that 
do the causing.  
From here, we will discuss a Vector Model of causes proposed by Mumford and Anjum, which 
will lead us into Mutual Manifestation. We will use Marmodoro’s partner-power model in 
conjunction with Mumford/Anjum’s idea of mutual manifestation. We will move on to a 
discussion of Simultaneity of the manifestation of cause/effect, and how we are to avoid challenges 
of infinite regress. We will follow with an account of dispositional modality and probabilistic 
models of causation, which will lead us into a discussion of a macro-model of causation based 
 
29
 For this to not lead to an infinite regress, we claim that these powers are ontologically codependent on their partner 




around powerful Agents and their dispositions. This model will be what we conclude the 
discussion of Powerism with, and it will be the model against with we compare O’Connor’s theory. 
Powerism  
Let us begin by defining what it is we mean by Powerism, and why we have turned to it in the first 
place. At a basic level, any theory of Powerism takes the attribution of causal powers, occasionally 
referred to as ‘dispositions’, to be ontologically fundamental. Things or objects in our world have a 
number of facts about them that describe how they act. Take a wine glass: it has a number of 
dispositions fundamental to its composition, such as the disposition to shatter when struck, to allow 
light to pass through, to change temperature according to its contents. These dispositions do not 
lead inevitably to what they describe, but rather imply a tendency towards an event when in the 
presence of some partner: the hammer to shatter, the light to shine, the cold liquid to chill. 
 These properties of the glass and their partner powers are what do our causal work, doing 
so because they themselves are powerful. Powers have possible manifestations though they may 
nevertheless exist unmanifested. Under our definition, these properties do not exist without being 
tied down to some thing. Properties are then properties of objects or things: length, volume, mass 
all have to be of some thing. So, when we say that the hammer broke the glass, we make claims 
about a cause-effect event and the objects involved therein. The hammer broke the glass and the 
glass was broken by the hammer because they have some causally powerful property that relates to 
this event. This rather general definition is a type of substance causation, in which “it is a 
something about the substance that does its causal work” (Mumford and Anjum, 1994).   
What, then, is an “event”? The commonsense construction of causal events is used by 
everybody all the time: pulling on the faucet causes the water to flow, swinging the hammer breaks 
the glass, and smoking causes cancer. Such construction is causal, but why is it so? We assume 
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some base level of background knowledge when we make these generalizations; we know it is not 
the act of smoking that causes cancer and swinging a noodle at a glass (probably) will not break it. 
It is rather the properties of the objects involved that do the causal work; properties such as mass, 
velocity, fragility, and so on
30
 are the truthmakers of our causal construction. So, then, events do 
exist, and we can explain them as the causal productions
31
 of powers at work. Event causation is 
merely the generative behavior of objects governed by their properties. In other words, events in 
our conversation about causation are the situations in which partnered properties come together—
how the sugar met the tea or how the mass met the fragile glass—but the events themselves are not 
what does the causing. It is rather the properties.  
There are both particular and general causal truths. Billiards balls rolling around a table are 
clearly particular causal events due to the chaotic nature of the game’s construction. General truths 
are a bit more obscure: smoking causing cancer is vaguer than the cue ball hitting the 8 at the right 
angle to go into a pocket, but the causal truth is still apparent. General causal claims mean that 
some cause C disposes towards some effect E only, which is not to say that every particular c will 
produce an effect e. There may be some singular causal truth that Tim’s smoking caused Tim’s 
cancer and there can be a general truth about smoking causing cancer, but this one case does not 
commit us irreversibly to the thesis of smoking causing cancer in all circumstances. There is a 
necessary context-dependence in all causal events, which appears to apply some kind of 
 
30
 The “smoking causes cancer” example, a common one used to illustrate long-term causation, can be confusing. As 
far as we understand it, it is not the individual inhalation through a cigarette that causes cancer but the cumulative 
detrimental impact on a person’s lungs from years of smoking that then causes the cancer. It is impossible to point to 
one specific event or inhalation and call it the sole cause of the cancer. Keep in mind that even this point was disputed 
for decades, albeit by those with a vested interest in such a connection’s falsehood, but the example serves to illustrate 
causal ambiguity to some extent.  
31
 This definition holds only for events that are caused. To explain uncaused events, see Norton’s Dome and 
discussion of indeterminism. 
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metaphysical priority to particular truths.
32
 In other words, the particular causal connections of 
some situation do not supervene on the causal powers of the agents. That is, fixing the causal 




In this talk of properties, all we have done to explain what they are is provide a few simple 
examples, neglecting to define what a property or a disposition actually is. Properties are clusters of 
causal powers
34
. The ontology is as simple as possible: powers are the base from which causation 
arises. Powers are thus the metaphysical bedrock of reality. All powers also have partner-powers, 
each of which serves as a necessary condition for the existence and manifestation of the other
35
 
(Marmodoro, p. 58, 2017). Each power can thereby be identified jointly by the type of activity its 
manifestation consists of and the possible types of partner-powers compatible with it, allowing for 
reciprocity of causation in a variety of causal scenarios. 
Consider heat, a property fires have and cold fingers (relatively) don’t. Heat as a property then 
has two partners: the power to warm and the power to be warmed. When a fire causes my fingers 
to become hotter, the fire’s power to heat is activated, manifesting by my fingers heating up. 
 
32
 There is really a token-type distinction here between particular and general truths. A token has to be of a type and 
each type exists in its tokens, and the degree to which one has priority over the other is unclear. Given the issues of 
context dependence we have raised, we will lean towards priority for particulars. 
33
 Countervailing powers explain much of this. The agent with the power to move their hands cannot do so when 
handcuffed, the ball cannot roll away when it is held, and so on. The manifestation of partnered powers requires 
specific circumstances to occur, particularly the presence of the partner powers. When Norton’s ball rolls down the 
dome, its powers are manifesting simultaneously at some indeterminate first instance. 
34
 This definition and our construction of events as moments of mutual manifestation is derived from a number of 
sources, of which the most prominent is Causes and Powers by Mumford and Anjum. 
35
 Of course, there can absolutely be more than just one partner, which allows for possible worlds arguments. We won’t 
get into these in this paper.  
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However, the fire’s heating of my fingers can take place only if my finger’s power to be heated is 
activated mutually and manifests itself by getting my fingers hotter.  
Some properties are a bit trickier to define. Take a property like sphericity: if properties 
bestow their bearers with causal powers since they are themselves clusters of causal powers
36
 what 
powers make up “being a sphere?” To explain, we must argue that sphericity is in fact a covert 
disposition
37
, such as the disposition to roll in a straight line down an inclined plane or to reflect 
light in a particular pattern or manner when  illuminated. A soap bubble sticks to an inclined 
plane, a ball weighted unevenly rolls erratically, and balls of clay deform and smush, but these are 
just spherical things that did not manifest this particular disposition. They instead manifested some 
other more powerful property. In the case of the soap bubble, while it is disposed to roll in a 
straight line due to its sphericity it fails to do so due to its countervailing power of stickiness, which 
is clearly more powerful due to the way in which it manifests. The weighted ball is disposed to roll 
in a straight line forwards but is overpowered by its simultaneous power to roll left towards the 
weighted section, and so on with the clay. These powers still exist even though they are 
unmanifested: they are simply too weak to reveal themselves in most cases.  
A causal power is then the potentiality to bring about some change or the activity of bringing 
about that change (Marmodoro, 2017). Nothing inert or impotent is needed within the power’s 
nature that anchors the power to reality
38
. Rather, there is nothing more to a power that its 
powerfulness: what the power can and cannot do. A power can potentially be its actuality, by which 
we mean that the potentiality is for the power’s activity when it is being exercised. The 
 
36
 These clusters of causal powers are made up of a number of distinct single powers. If they have substantially different 
powers than is apparent from their component powers, the issue of emergence arises, which we will not discuss here. 
37
 Sydney Shoemaker has a different theory, identifying such properties with conditional dispositions: i.e. the 
disposition to roll a certain way if the object were to become rigid and persistent. This is another possibility which 
makes properties functions of powers 
38
 For a critique of this position, see John Hawthorne’s paper “Causal Structuralism” 
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powerfulness of a power is then its capacity to actively engage in an activity such as a doing or a 
suffering. This is not equivalent to saying that the powerfulness of a power is its readiness to get 
activated or to instantaneously ‘jump’ into another power—the activated power is still the power 
under our view. 
This idea of partnered powers and mutual manifestation may entice us into thinking that, at a 
fundamental level, reality is a web of relations. This is not the case, as powers are not polyadic 
relation properties. Furthermore, there is no polyadic relation connecting a power in potentiality to 
its manifestation since the manifestation of a power is numerically the same power in a different 
state. Nor is the essential nature of a power P understood to be a different power Q to which P in 
potentiality is related; P is one with its essential nature (see Marmodoro 2009; 2013). 
The essence of a power tells us what type of entity the power is; namely, if it is the sort that can 
do such and such type of activity to this or that type of thing. To be clear, there is no polyadic 
relation connection a power to its power partners. Powers are ontologically dependent on their 
partners, but ontological dependence is not a polyadic relation
39
. Powers are instead monadic 
properties of a special kind in that they have intentionality or ‘directedness’ towards something. 
Aristotle discusses the idea in the Categories: 
“We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, 
or in some other way in relation to something else. For example, what is larger is called 
what is than something else (it is called larger than something); and what is double is called 
what is of something else (it is called double of something); similarly with all such other 
cases” (Aristotle, Categories 6a36-b3) 
 
39
 Strawson argues that this idea is true only when powers are ‘extrinsically’ specified, , i.e. specified with respect to 
something else. He says that the basic ‘power being’ of a thing is just its intrinsic nature considered wholly 
independently of anything else. Thus: x is ABCDEFGH (description of its intrinsic nature). This is why x does Q to y 
(has the power to do Q to y) and does R to z (has the power to do R to z), and so on and so on. Alternatively one can 
say that it is its x being B in particular that is the reason why it has the power to do A to y and so on. 
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There is clearly then some ontological relation between these properties, and we can call such a 
relation an interdependence. 
“If there is no master, there is no slave either…When there is a slave there is a master; and 
similarly with the others [sc. other relatives]…Also, each carries the other to destruction; for 
if there is not a double there is not a half, and if there is not a half there is not a double. So 
too with other such cases” (Aristotle, Categories 7b6-22) 
These ontological interdependencies of causal powers are thereby not polyadic relations holding 
between them. They are rather the mutual conditions that enable their respective existence and 
activity. A power P is manifesting when such and such a power P’ (where P=/=P’ ) is satisfying such 
and such conditions, for example that it exists, it is appropriately located, nothing impedes it, and 
so on. In the case of the fire warming my fingers from before, we can consider the fire’s heating 
power to be P and my fingers power to be heated P’.  
 Causation, too, is not a web of relations. Causation often involves a change. When it does 
so, there is an event, and events as we have constructed them are to be understood essentially as 
changes rather than as property exemplifications. A particular exemplifying a property at a time 
would be better understood as a state of affairs. Causation is then not a simple relation between 
two events but rather a state of affairs coupled with powerful properties that make an event occur.  
 We are then in a position where we have powerful partnered powers with mutual 
ontological codependence but no polyadic web of relations. A cause is understood to be something 
that disposes to some degree towards an effect, so causation is events happening as they do 
because the agents therein have the powers that they have. In the fire example, the fire should be 
understood as having the disposition to warm a human body among other things. This is true in 
both the general and particular case: all fire has the disposition to warm things colder than it, and 
this particular fire disposes to the warming of this particular body that is in its vicinity. Every event 
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can be interfered with to a variety of degrees by countervailing powers. To explain this, we turn 
towards a vector model of causes. 
Vector Model  
We first need some method of explaining what change looks like. What we called a state of affairs 
before can be reduced to a one-dimensional “quality space” such as the one proposed by 
Lombard. When one thing causes another to warm, it is causing a movement in the quality space 
for “heat.” The quality space, pictured below in Figure 2.1, is the background against which events 
can occur in our vector model. We decide here to employ vectors as a simple yet illustrative model 
of causation as they have both direction (intentionality/directedness) and intensity (powerfulness), 





















Think of F and G as the two sides of the heating coin, with F being “hot” and G being “cold.” 
In Figure 2.2 above, we see a single vector plotted on the same one-dimensional quality space. To 
be precise, the figure illustrates a certain moment at a certain starting point on the F-G quality 
space where there is a single disposition towards F in operation (exercising its power). From this 
simple picture, a large list of questions arises. First and foremost, this picture is nothing like the 
real world. In every real situation there will be a number of relevant powers disposing in wildly 
different directions. Some, like the picture above, may dispose towards heating or cooling, but 
others may be completely orthogonal and dispose towards a color change or a gain in weight. We 
can thus have an object undergoing a number of simultaneous changes. However, these vector 
diagrams are meant to represent only one specific causal situation relating solely to the powers that 
are causally relevant to one dimension of the property, impacting only one subject.  
Figure 2.2: A disposition towards F 
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We must also explain what it is we mean by a “moment” in these diagrams. The vectors in a 
quality space represent only the operating dispositions without actually showing any real change. If 
change were to occur, we would have to represent it with an entirely new vector diagram. That 
being said, a moment should not be thought of by default as an infinitely small time slice or 
indivisible instant. A world of powers implies a world of “active, dynamic particulars” (see Harre 
and Madden 1973) which yields some problems for any attempts to time slice (see Mumford 
2009). Issues of dynamism and flux are also relevant. We are thus to think of a moment as 
allowing for some extension through time, as powers can take time to do their work
40
. Moments, 
therefore, are temporally open events.  
 
40
 A clear example of temporally extended powers is the fireplace in a cold room. During the winter months, especially 
in the older, poorly insulated homes, by the time you get home from work the temperature in your home will be far 
below comfortable, so you build and light a fire. While rewarding and pretty to look at, this fire doesn’t suddenly solve 
the issue of the cold—its power to heat the air around it takes time, and the heat transfer process in the air molecules 
does not occur instantaneously. The “moment” to describe the room being heated could be indefinite—after all, the 
room is poorly insulated and there is a simultaneous countervailing cold power from the outside world.  
Figure 2.3: Multiple powers (countervailing) 
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Figure 2.2 is not an entirely accurate image of the world as we know it. A more realistic model 
is given in Figure 2.3, where multiple powers dispose the object in either direction. In order to 
determine the resultant vector, simple vector addition will suffice; remember that the length of the 
vectors corresponds to the “powerfulness” or magnitude of the power, so that when summed there 
will be some cumulative effect resulting from the input of all relevant dispositions. 
 The model then shows what it is to be a cause
41
, namely, to be one of the operating powers 
represented as a vector that disposes towards an effect. Whether, how, and to what extent the 
effect occurs will be determined polygenically by vector addition
42
. As you can see above, 
countervailing powers can affect the timing, chance, or extent of an effect. Are they then 
considered part of the cause of the effect, even though they dispose in the opposite direction? We 
should here say that countervailing powers were not necessarily a cause of the effect without ruling 
out the possibility that those same powers could be a cause of the effect happening in a particular 
way.  
 Effects are thereby shown to be the product of many powers acting together
43
, and it is 
possible that the sum of these powers may have a zero resultant vector. This is a non-issue in the 
vector model and in real life—a tug of war is essentially the countervailing powers principle. The 
same power can produce different overall effects depending on which other powers combine with 
it. Powers can thus have different partners for the production of different mutual manifestations. 
This can clearly be shown in the vector model, which allows a power to be depicted working with 
 
41
 The vector-causal model comes entirely from Mumford and Anjum’s Getting Causes from Powers 
42
 A distinction between causes and background conditions cannot have any real ontological strength because the effect 
is not triggered until they are all present, which can in any case be a momentary matter. At that moment, it matters 
little from the point of view of the effect that one of the factors that contributed to it had been around for ten hours 
while another had only been around for a second.  
43
 This is not always the case—there are possible single powers in operation in specific scenarios, such as radioactive 




other powers on different quality spaces. Similarly, we can imagine the vector model being 





Can this vector model be squared with the mutual manifestation conception of causation we raised 
before? Let us recall that these vectors, like in real life, indication dispositions towards an action 
and are not all realized when countervailed. Two orthogonal force vectors acting simultaneously on 
an object do not pull the object first one way and then the other—they act together, pulling the 
object on the bisector of their respective angle. So too with causal powers. To explain, let us break 
down a seemingly simple example: tossing a ball in the air. 
 As we have established, causation can be thought of as the mutual manifestation of powers 
composing some broader event. When I toss a ball into the air, I am manifesting my power to 
throw and the ball its power to be moved in a direction by a sufficient force. As the ball rises, the 
air around it is resisting and slowing the balls movement, while the ball’s low friction and 
aerodynamic properties allow it to continue to move upwards. The mass of the Earth is also 
manifesting itself in the slowing of the ball coupled with the ball’s necessary relativistic tendencies. 
At the peak of the throw, the ball has a velocity of zero, but a number of powers are continuing 
their manifestation—gravity to pull it down, air to hold it up, friction to hold it in place, and 
whatever spin it has to distort the air around it, all of which can be imagined in respect to their 
partners. As the ball falls, a similar process occurs and it returns to my hands, where powers and 
dispositions continue to drive action ad infinitum.  
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 For a discussion of issues of overdetermination, see Mumford and Anjum’s Getting Causes from Powers 
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 It may appear that Mumford and Anjum’s vector addition picture commits one to 
determinism—once the vectors are in place, the effect seems to be directly determined—but this is 
not the case. Vectors are not all compositionally the same. While some have consistent physical 
power, others can be probabilistic, manifesting only some of the time, or even indeterministic, 
manifesting all by themselves without any interference to produce changes. Vector addition 
performed with these must not be straightforward summation but rather have some other 
mechanism by which these powers are exercised and can either contribute to the cause which 
would have occurred without their existence or turn towards some entirely different event. Rather 
than committing us to determinism, the vector model provides us with some structure by which we 
can understand the manifestation of powers.  
 So, then, we have some idea of causation, but we have a big question to answer: time. 
Specifically, when do these powers manifest? Do they occur simultaneously, one before the other, 
or in some unknowable way? Perhaps most importantly, which has temporal priority, the cause or 
the effect? There is a risk of regress here, about when specifically there is a change from cause to 
effect. To answer, we turn to the same argument used in Norton’s Dome: 
The natural move is to look for some “first instant” of motion and from there find the 
cause of the motion at that instant…[this] is a misconception and the cause of confusion at 
first glance. Rather time 𝑡 = 𝑇 is the last  instant at which the mass does not move. There is 
no first instant at which the mass moves. Motion occurs only over the interval 𝑡 > 𝑇 and 
this interval has no first instant. That is, for any 𝜀 > 0, it is the case that |𝑡 − 𝑇| > 𝜀 for all 
real numbers t, T with 𝑡 ≠ 𝑇 . In other words, there is no possible first instant candidate 
which cannot be preceded by an earlier candidate. Thus we conclude that there is no first 
instant of motion and thereby no first instant at which to seek the initiating cause. 
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To extend this issue to the manifestation of powers, there is then no first instant of manifestation. 
We can consider then the cause and the effect to be temporally extended events which overlap in a 
number of cases. The effect as we think of it is in fact the event of mutual manifestation—the 
hammer hitting the glass, the ball falling off the shelf, the keyboard sending signals to the screen. 
There is no restriction on the time it takes for the effect to manifest, for much of what we perceive 
as effects are highly delayed results. Effects can occur instantaneously, such as in cases of quantum 
entanglement, or over the course of years in macro-events such as weather patterns and economic 
turns. That there is no gap in time between powers being suitably partnered and acting is not a 
contradiction because causation involves “continuous processes that are extended through time 
and involve many changes of properties” (Mumford and Anjum, 2014). 
 To reiterate, we do not think of deterministic causation as a fundamental building block of 
reality, but rather of powers as the pieces of the puzzle and causation as the image thereby derived, 
meaning that causation in some way is, in fact, fundamental. Where these powers exist and what 
this causation looks like is a question to be answered in the next chapter, but we have thus far 
constructed some reasonable model of how to think of powers, causation, and indeterministic 






Any discussion of Agent Causation and what it entails is a discussion of the metaphysics of free 
will, which we have yet to do. Agent Causation theorists argue that causally powerful agents are 
necessary features of any theory of freely chosen action, even though there are a number of 
possible intentional activities without free action all together
45
. Agent Causationists are also mostly 
Incompatibilists, the thesis that there is no world in which determinism and free will can coexist. 
They, like us, argue that the absence of determinism is not enough for freedom to occur, so they 
posit some basic requirements for models of free, responsible agency. AC Theorists must give a 
clear account of what they mean by ‘agent control’: the manner in which a particular piece of 
behavior is connected to, controlled by, or is ‘an outflowing of’ the agent. They must also allow for 
the possibility of alternative, viable courses of action that are genuinely open to the agent.  
There is some degree of intuitive pull towards these theories. The agent has a number of 
internal states with “objective tendencies of some determinate measure to cause certain outcomes” 
(O’Connor, Oxford, 340)
46
 This then provides an opening into what could be agent control, in 
which the agent can freely select from a plurality of real alternatives, but once again the mere 
existence of an opening does not lead inevitably through said door. AC Theorists provide that 




 C.A. Campbell, 1967; John Thorp 1980; Allan Donagan 1987; Randolph Clarke 1993, 1996; and Timothy 
O’Connor 1993, 1995, and 2000 are among those who have specifically taken this view 
46
 This and much of the discussion to come is drawn from two sources: Timothy O’Connor’s “Libertarian Views: 
Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p. 337-355, and Persons and Causes: 
The Metaphysics of Free Will.  
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Simple and Causal Indeterminism 
Before we dive deeper into Agent Causation, we should first discuss a failed preliminary 
attempt at explaining free will in a causally indeterministic
47
 world, for it is the precursor to what is 
to come. Specifically, I am talking about Carl Ginet’s Simple Indeterminism, the thesis that agent 
control is noncausal in nature and that there is a simple mental action lacking internal causal 
structure at the core of every causally complex action. He argues that these acts instead have some 
“actish phenomenal quality” that separates them intrinsically from unbidden thoughts or images. In 
other words, these conscious mental actions have a feeling of direct production or control. 
This action, as conceived of by Ginet, is some volition that causally generates a person’s 
voluntary exertion of her body directed to the immediate present. In the case of raising one’s 
finger, this volition becomes a “fluid mental activity over time” (Ginet, 1966). Whereas our actions 
may be uncaused, at the bottom they are not inexplicable. Reasons and reason codes explain our 
actions by entering into the contents of whatever the guiding volitions may be. Ginet discusses 
action in the following manner: 
“To determine an event is to act in such a way that one’s action makes it the case that the 
event occurs. Let us grant that if the event is not one’s own action, then this requires that 
the event be causally necessitated by one’s own action and thus that it not be an 
undetermined event. But if the event is one’s own action, then one’s determining it requires 
only that one perform it; and one’s performing it, which is just the action’s occurring, is 
compatible with that event’s being undetermined, not causally necessitated by antecedents” 
(Ginet, p. 127, 1966). 
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 A discussion of causal indeterminism as O’Connor conceives of it is to follow, but we shall be able to square it with 
the models we have established in previous chapters.  
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Such an account is unsatisfactory. The notion of my determining an event to occur does not have 
independent content and is not equivalent to my bringing it about as there is no necessary causal 
content. Determining an event in this context is necessitating it as part of a causal chain outside of 
agent control, while to bring an event about is to actively control the event’s outcome. Is an event 
an action merely because of the phenomenal character of the mental event as its origin? The 
phenomenal quality of such events should be entirely irrelevant. 
 So, this account, with the addition of an account of the lack of external control, involves 
causation only in a negative manner. It requires the absence of certain kinds of controlling factors 
or what we have called thus far ‘countervailing powers.’ Positively, it consists merely in the 
occurrence of an event having an “actish phenomenal quality,” which is implausible in the same 
way that broader Phenomenalism is implausible about the ontological structure of the world. We 
are committed in our theories to Realism: seemings are not sufficient for realities. 
 The agent then must be able to control her actions by way of her prior reasons and thought 
processes, which may cause but not necessitate whatever her actions may be. O’Connor calls this 
thesis “causal indeterminism” and sets out to refute it. Deterministic or probabilistic causal theories 
can successfully underwrite a weak kind of agent control, yet not any kind of free will, for the 
theories fail to allow for any form of real alternative choices or possibilities for the agent to take. 
Carl Ginet’s simple indeterminism yields such possibilities, but there is no apparent agent control. 
If we instead consider causal indeterminism, we may have an avenue of attack. The causal relation 
of the deterministic picture fails to link some belief-desire complex to the subsequent action; it 
instead links some set of prior mental states and an action with no active agent control.  
It is entirely possible that this connection between mental states and action is purely 
probabilistic. For the causal indeterminist, free will would still be possible only if there was some 
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level of control over the probabilities of mental states leading to action. If rather there is some set 
of probabilities about competing internal desires that dictate which action the agent takes, it is 
unclear where the agent control comes in to play in the causal indeterminist picture. If we can 
conceive of a causal relation that constitutes some form of agent control, there is no clear reason 
why this relation must be necessitating. Our beliefs and desires vary, but many of them are 
enduring and constitute central features to our own self-conceptions. When we act in alignment 
with these complexes, or when our actions are causally produced by these central features, they are 
products of “who we are” at the moment of the effect’s occurrence. This does not require that the 
actions be a deterministic outcome of prior mental states, only a causal outcome. The causal 
indeterminist holds that in many circumstances, persons have distinct desire-belief complexes or 
reasons that point towards different courses of action and that the performance of any of these 
would coherently graft onto precisely the same prior circumstance. Thus, each reason is a potential 




Notice that this picture does not solve the picture of free agency. While causal 
indeterminism allows for genuine variety of possibilities, it does no more for agent control than 
claim that such actions are merely ‘outflowings of’ the agent, not freely chosen by the agent. Rather, 
it falls into a statistical or quasi-statistical tendency that governs the general pattern of behavior. 
Probabilistic tendency is an insufficient mechanism for free control. While agents still are the cause 
of events in a probabilistic picture, it is unclear how they actually exert control freely instead of 
being mere conveyors of probability under causal indeterminism.  
 
48
 This does not contain any explanation for uncaused events  
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Before going further into O’Connor’s theory of agent causation, we discuss Storrs McCall’s 
picture of causally indeterministic freedom of choice. Without getting too deep into the 
fundamental physics of his theory, his conception of the universe is useful and provides us with 
some further requirements for a sufficient picture of free will. According to McCall, reality is a 
multi-variated space-time structure that is branching along the time axis, each branch of which is a 
four-dimensional manifold that constitutes a physically possible future. The present is the first 
branch point, with the past below it (the universe’s ‘trunk’) and the future the set of branches 
beyond it. Objective probabilities are a function of branch proportionality, and the flow of time is 
constituted by branch attrition—the falling away of all possibilities relative to a given moment save 
one. 
He then argues that the prima facie problem for the causally indeterministic account is as 
follows: absent determinism or at least a high probability of a particular outcome, one cannot 
speak of an event as being caused—it is instead random. Thus, an understanding of responsible 
free agency requires, in addition to significant indeterminism in the process leading up to a choice, 
a mechanism of nonrandom selection that permits an intentional explanation of the choice. Any 
such explanation is irreducible to explanation in terms of the causal probability of the outcome, for 
as we have discussed previously such reductions lead to mere outflowings with no apparent real 
agency or possibility for control. 
O’Connor’s Agent Causation  
The basic tenet of Agency Theory is the following: at the core of every free action is an 
ontologically irreducible causal relation between a person and some appropriate mental or internal 
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event that triggers later elements of the action
49
. This claim is subject to a number of challenges, a 
few of which we shall discuss. The first is the idea of an “Infinite Regress of Choice” in which each 
potentially causing event, specifically internal mental events, is itself caused by some level of meta-
cause, with this meta-cause itself being caused by a higher level of cause, and so on ad infinitum. In 
1788, Thomas Reid put the challenge in the following way: 
“’Liberty,’ they say, ‘consists only in a power to act as we will; and it is impossible to 
conceive in any being a greater liberty than this…To say that we have power to will such an 
action, is to say, that we may will it, if we will. This supposes the will to be determined by a 
prior will; and, for the same reason, that will must be determined by a will prior to it, and 
so on in an infinite series of wills, which is absurd” (Reid 501) 
According to O’Connor, this is a mischaracterization of the theory: we do not need to have 
performed a prior act of will in order to have determined the action-initiating volition. We exert 
active power (which we conceive of through its effects/manifestations) in so determining it; we 
determine the will directly, and the exertion of the active power is not itself a type of volition. This 
is a reasonable response. We can conceive of volitions as a type of mental event akin to what we 
have called intentions: causally initiating behaviors of a certain type which often are expressed 
immediately in some way. There is no apparent need for a prior will here, for the two are merely 
simultaneous.  
 However, even if the exertion of active power is not to be understood as a prior willing, 
isn’t it a prior event of some sort or other? If so, this collapses back into simple indeterminism. To 
avoid this, we have to clarify what exactly we mean by the “exertion of an active power.” An 
exertion of active power is to be understood as not an event at all. It is rather the instantiation of a 
causal relation between agent and volition, which is exactly how we have previously categorized the 
 
49
 Part of the job is reconciling two prima facie different conceptions of causation: event and agent causation 
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mutual manifestation of powers. Looking ahead, it is entirely consistent with the Powerist picture 
we have provided to conceive of these volitions and wills as themselves pieces of the mutual 
manifestation of partnered powers, which occurring at a specific time constitutes agents acting in 
events. Are these instantiations not causally complex events? The willing as a component of these 
instantiations can be compared to temporally extended events we have discussed before, such as 
the heating of a room. Volitions and their exertions are analogous to shorter events composing 
longer events as parts.  
To discuss where agent causation comes in, we must first note that a particular which freely 
and directly brings about an effect has to be an agent that can represent possible courses of action 
to himself and have desires and beliefs about those alternatives (Reid 1788). O’Connor thus argues  
that agent causes bring about immediately executive states of intention to act in various ways: 
“This direct causing by agents of states of intention goes like this: parallel to event causes, 
the distinctive capacities of agent causes (‘active powers’) are grounded in a property or set 
of properties.
50
 So any agent having the relevant internal properties will have it directly 
within his power to [sic] cause any of a range of states of intention delimited by internal and 
external circumstances. However, these properties function differently in the associated 
causal process. Instead of being associated with ‘functions from circumstance to effects,’ 
they (in conjunction with appropriate circumstances) make possible the agent’s producing 
an effect. These choice-enabling properties ground a different type of causal power or 
capacity—one that in suitable circumstances is freely exercised by the agent himself.” 
(O’Connor p. 72, 2000) 
This picture carries with it a number of ontological commitments. First, universals and particulars 
are taken as basic ontological categories. Concerning particulars, also known here as agents, we 
 
50
 At a glance, this appears to be a problem: our previous construction of powers and properties has properties defined 
as mere clusters of causal powers, while this claims the reverse. This is entirely reconcilable. Our picture still holds, 
and what O’Connor here calls “agent causes” and “active powers” are either simply properties or clusters of properties. 
Either remain compatible with our ontology. 
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require that they include things that endure through time, wholly existing at each moment of an 
extended temporal interval (not perdure). Agents are not required to be a kind of substance 
radically diverse from physical substance, although the powers of agents must not be reducible to 
the powers of their micro-physical constituents. Properties are understood to be universals
51
 that 
have essentially their dispositional tendencies—tendencies as interpreted by the causal powers 
account of causation, which is compatible with our previous picture. Lastly, universals are 




 The agency theorist must still explain how reasons come in to play. Many philosophers, 
specifically under the light of compatibilism, argue that reasons can explain an action only to the 
extent that they directly produce it.
53
 The agency theorist disagrees with this conclusion, instead 
believing that reasons can explain an action without leading directly to the action’s production. 
This allows O’Connor and his contemporaries to provide a schematic sufficiency
54
 of free action in 
terms of an antecedent desire: 
 
51
 Without contradiction here, we can refer to properties as corresponding to natural classes or resemblance classes of 
particulars 
52
 These commitments can clearly be controversial and argued over ad nauseum. It is not the goal of this work to argue 
them any further, and they appear to hold up at least to common sense. Aristotle discusses many of the issues here in 
all of his works. 
53
 This claim about the general philosophic understanding comes from O’Connor, and while generalizations about 
what philosophers agree upon are rarely correct this one serves its purpose as a strawman effectively. 
54
 In a footnote of his own, O’Connor briefly discusses his reasoning for non-necessitation, which is based upon the 
potential for divine action in creation: “I do not provide necessary conditions on the concept of acting for a reason 
because a belief-desire causal theory is an alternative way this concept (though not that of freely acting {at a reason) 
could be realized. How about for the more specific concept of acting for a reason in the agent-causal way? I’m again 
hesitant to say that the conditions I provide are necessary, although I think they come close. The hesitancy concerns 
the rather extraordinary case of the possibility of divine action in creation. One way of thinking about this—common in 
medieval philosophy—has it that there is no change in God as a consequence of His creating the world. (Were He to 
have created a different world, or none at all, His intrinsic state would have been exactly the same) I think sense can be 
made of this idea by conceiving God's intention to create not as a purely intrinsic state—one that would vary, depending 
on which world He created—but as a causally relational state between Himself (whose intrinsic state is properly 
characterized as a state of willing Himself) and the resulting creation.” (O’Connor 85n1)  
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 “The agent acted then in order to satisfy his antecedent desire that θ if:  
1. prior to this action, the agent had a desire that θ and believed that by so acting, he 
would satisfy (or contribute to satisfying) that desire; 
2. the agent’s action was initiated (in part) by his own self-determining causal activity, the 
event component of which is the-coming-to-be-of-an-action-triggering-intention-to-so-
act-here-and-now-to-satisfy-θ; 
3. concurrent with this action, he continued to desire that θ and intended of this action 
that it satisfy (or contribute to satisfying) that desire; and 
4. the concurrent intention was a direct causal consequence (intuitively, a continuation) of 
the action-triggering intention brought about by the agent, and it causally sustained the 
completion of the action” (O’Connor 86) 
These reasons can themselves be indeterminate on things like timing, environment, and other 
various factors without contradiction. Similarly, an agent can have reasons for an action which he 
performs yet these reasons not be the direct cause, for reasons can plausibly cause actions without 
determining them. It also allows for the limiting case: total conscious ignorance of one’s intention 
in acting. In such circumstances, the response should be plain: the action is not free, and there is 
no direct agent control over such action. The existence of unfree action is not a contradiction to 
free action at large, but rather just an example of an agent’s lack of complete and total control. 
Similarly, mis-remembered or mistaken perceptions of one’s intentions occur frequently in real 
life—actions with unintended consequences are often realized to be the direct result of an internal 
mistake after the fact, and the agency theorist has some awareness of his slip-up.  
Event Causation and Wayward Causal Chains 
The question we are left to answer now is thus whether an agent’s originating activity is itself an 
event with causes, which would reduce any theory of agent causation to event causation. Event 
causation comes from the Neo-Humean model of causation, in which laws, dispositions, and 
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powers are not fundamental truths about the world. Rather, categorical truths about the 
distributions of qualities and other general features about space-time are fundamental. Causal 
connections are thereby derived in this picture. Events are understood here as the landscape of the 
environment at a particular time. One event immediately causes another event through their 
respective space-time relation, the internal qualities of the two events, and the laws of nature. Since 
this theory is blatantly incompatible with the models of Powerism established in previous chapters, 
we must ensure that our causal theories do not collapse into this type of causation.
 55
 
Event causation’s reliance on Neo-Humean theory makes it an insufficient mechanism for 
explaining free will. Richard Taylor highlights the irreducibility of free action to event causation, 
arguing that actions are to be analyzed as behavior with certain specific types of mental causes such 
as volitions or belief-desire states, claims that any event-causal view inescapably faces two fatal 
difficulties: (1) a behavior of the agent’s being caused by a mental event is consistent with that 
mental event itself being caused by a manipulative agent and (2) if the reductive account is given as 
an analysis of intentional action, a further difficulty arises: wayward causal chains, according to 
which reasons can cause the expected outcome but in such an unusual way that the output is 
clearly not the original intent of the agent.  
Taylor’s approach involves supplementing to agent theory in such a way that all actions 
involve an irreducible causal relation between the agents and the events internal to his action; 
problem (1) above then couldn’t be described as an action the agent performs, as the agent had 
nothing to do with the event’s occurrence (Taylor p. 94, 1966). O’Connor provides an alternative 
analysis of wayward causal chains: 
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 In the closing section, we discuss the distinction between agent causation and event causation.  
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“Consider a familiar sequence of events. My finger presses the doorbell button, the 
doorbell rings, and your cat jumps in fright. We may sensibly say that my finger's pressing 
the button causes the causal sequence, the ringing of the bell's causing the cat to jump . But 
what we mean here is simply that it caused the sequence indirectly, by causing the first 
element of the sequence, the bell's ringing. We may also sensibly say that the electrician's 
wiring of the doorbell system was a cause of the sequence, the depressing of the button's 
causing the bell to ring…we may term this latter episode one of 'structural' causation, which 
consists in establishing a causal pathway — here, the wiring and power supply — between 
two objects or systems that is subsequently triggered by some appropriate event. Here we 
mean only that the 'structuring' cause provided a context in which some causal factor 
exerted its characteristic effect. It is not to say that the establishment of an electrical 
pathway in any way brought about or enabled the button's depression's exerting its 
characteristic influence on its immediate environment, only that it will determine one 
important wider effect of that influence.” (O’Connor p. 53, 2000) 
Both of the scenarios discussed above discuss causes of causings, yet neither seem to support the 
idea of a cause of an agent’s causing her own intention. In the first understanding, there is no 
contradiction or connection to agent causation—the agent is acting freely as part of a temporally 
extended causal chain. In the second understanding, it is clearer that free action is involved, yet 
there is still no need to invoke some other layer of mental state to explain the wayward causal 
chain. There are countless external factors influencing the causal activity of any basic cause, so 
saying that an agent causes his own intention should be rejected outright—there is not an event-
causal tie between reason and action here.  
Analysis 
We thus argue that agent causation is an ontological primitive. Within the terms of an agency 
theory of action, one cannot reduce the notion of agent causality to other, more basic notions. 
There are a number of conclusions to draw. Firstly, it is important not to misconstrue talk of an 
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agent’s exertion of active power. This term, in O’Connor’s view, does correspond to a special type 
of event, but this event is not to be thought of as prior to and constitutively separate from the 
intention that is the agent’s immediate effect. Second, reflection on the nature of an agent’s 
originating activity suggests that there cannot be a cause that produces it. That something can bring 
about the causing of this event is apparently absurd. The agent’s causing of an event and the event 
itself are not separate existences, so nothing could directly cause the first without directly causing 
the second. There is no principled way of stopping at one specific level of metacauses and positing 
an infinite series of metacauses is logically vicious and prima facie false. We also argue that 
exerting active power is intrinsically a direct exercise of control over one’s own behavior. 
This does not lead us perfectly into free will. O’Connor acknowledges this, and presents a 
few further questions to be answered: how is the agency theorist thinking of causation more 
generally such that we can understand the idea of agent causation as a kind of causation distinct 
from event causation? How do factors structure the range of an agent’s active power or influence 
the exercise of such power, consistent with the claim that such exercises are not the sort of events 
that may be produced by any such factors? Does the strong conception of freedom of action within 
the agency theory, together with uncontroversial observations about the nature of human 
deliberation and action, suggest that freedom of action is far less frequent in human beings than 
ordinarily supposed? Lastly, how can we give a consistent philosophical account of the limited 
presence of active power in a world that is fundamentally event-causal in character, and can any 
such account be reconciled with the emerging scientific conception of nature? 
The common-sense view of ourselves as fundamentally causal agents—not “unmoved 
movers” but rather “not wholly moved movers”—is apparently internally consistent and 
theoretically comprehensible through the lens of event causation. The primitive element of 
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causation conceptually is the producing or bringing about of an effect. As we have shown 
previously, causation is thereby not the constant conjunction of cause and effect nor a form of 
counterfactual dependence. A causal relation can be obtained between an agent and some event 
internal to herself, which does not imply that the type of event effected on one specific occasion 
will or would always be produced under relevantly similar circumstances—in other words, there is 
no necessitation relation in causation. All causation is agent causation—substances jointly exercising 
causal powers. Free action is intentional agent causation, but this is simply a species of the 
agent/substance causation we see in the inorganic world. 
Under the classic causal powers picture we consider powerful particulars, which when 
placed into the appropriate circumstances can manifest their causal powers into observable effects. 
The powers of these objects are based on their underlying nature—their physical form, genetic 
composition, chemical constitution, and dynamical structure. Circumstances or states of affairs 
prompt the exercise of a power in one of two ways: by stimulating a latent mechanism into action, 
or by removing inhibitors to the activity of a mechanism in a state of readiness to act. This 
construction parallels that of our mutual manifestation picture as well as the vector models posited 
in the previous chapter; the vectors are the causal powers and the event space is the state of affairs 
in one dimension.  
 From this schematic follows free action, yet interestingly nowhere therein is consciousness 
found. These rules could be plausibly fulfilled by some unaware automata—is that all we are? 
Without going into deep neurobiological concepts, taking agency theory seriously requires at least 
some discussion of the issues. Principal among these is precisely upon which underlying properties 
or physical attributes agent-causal capacity lies. What features, functionally or otherwise, constitute 
some system being a free agent, and what would it take for a free agent to no longer be free? There 
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is enormous difficulty in this issue, and it is ultimately an empirical matter not able to be solved 
philosophically, but the agency theorist casually conjectures that  “a function of biological 
consciousness, in its specifically human manifestations, is to subserve the very agent-causal 
capacity” we’ve been discussing (O’Connor, p. 122, 2000).  
We are avoiding here any reference to issues of consciousness, scientific pictures of the 
world, or emergence as a concept. While we do use emergence to some degree, we do not have 
the capacity here to argue out its finer details. Similarly, biological issues of consciousness are not 
here addressed, for I am far from qualified for discussing issues of the mind. We rather provide in 
this paper some plausible theory of the way the world is structured and how humans as free agents 
fit into it. There are of course issues to be argued further, and this is not the final word on free will 







Compatibility, Objections, and Conclusion 
Compatibility  
We then have a picture of agent causation as an explainer for free action and will, with issues of 
control, sufficiency and determination, reasoning, and causation explained to some degree. How 
does this theory square with our previously established ontology? In particulars, which here we call 
agents, we find the powers we argue to be fundamental, with their ability to cause thereby derived. 
The existence of powerful particulars slots perfectly on top of our picture, a few dimensions above 
but plausible constructed from our basic vector models. The mutual manifestation of powers 
doesn’t create contradictions either—there are a huge number of partnered powers manifesting at 
every given moment or event, so when zoomed out we can think of the agent and her respective 
powers pairing with the powers of the environment surrounding them to produce the effects 
desired. To avoid issues of overdetermination, we have both powers and causation as fundamental 
to our ontology.  
 What about freedom? This too fits. Consider what the powers are: they are all powers to 
something. They have direction and intention and inclination towards some object. Their 
collective impact on a particular or an agent constitutes intentionality, specifically in the presence of 
conscious thought. The impact is understood to be the agent’s reasoning for actions, and the 
indeterminate nature of these powers and causation at large, as discussed previously, allows for the 
agent to have agency. In providing the schema for control over actions, O’Connor and the agency 
theorists provide the emergence of free action into the world. Note that this is free action is not an 
addition to our ontology but rather a derivative truth, functionally useful and conceptually sound 
enough for us to claim freedom at an agent/human level of existence.  
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Event vs. Agent Causation  
However, just because agent causation is coherent does not mean it is correct. Much of the work of 
this thesis has been to build a theory of causation and powers from which free will emerges. At the 
moment, all we have done is build some parallel theories which are interesting but potentially 
entirely irrelevant to one another, so to connect the two we must answer questions and challenges 
about the central feature of both: causation and how it is put to work. 
 In the previous section, we discussed a problem O’Connor needs to address: how is the 
agency theorist thinking of causation such that we can understand the idea of agent causation as a 
kind of causation distinct from event causation? He holds that agent causation alone is essentially 
intentional and purposive. The locution of freedom is then in the agent’s causing an intention for a 
reason. Event causation then has no intentionality therein, but event causation too involves the 
exercise of some primitive capacities in an indeterministic manner. Both hold that whatever 
happens is made to happen for some cause, but the cause, be it agent or event, operating 
indeterministically implies only that it has a positive tendency in total circumstances toward more 
than one type of outcome (O’Connor 2002). Consider Norton’s Dome: the ball is then an agent 
with two possible outcomes, rolling or staying, with indeterministic tendencies towards both.  
 So the division between event and agent causation lies in intentionality. Can we reduce 
event causation further? To do so, we discuss what is actively causing when we discuss events. We 
talk about the ‘total cause’ of some event, and what makes up this total cause in our ontology is 
powerful particulars.  Event causation is then merely the generative behavior of objects governed 
by their properties. Events are the situations in which partnered properties come together but the 
events themselves are not what does the causing. It is rather the properties of the agents therein. 
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Event causation is then second class to agent causation, and any discussion of it is essentially a 
discussion of a collection of empowered agents acting in various manners. 
 The theory of powers thus answers the question of event vs. agent causation. Event 
causation is a derivation of the actions of various powerful agents collectively contributing to an 
event, agents which can be free or unfree without contradiction. Agents in these circumstances are 
powerful, which allows us to call event causation a mere functional truth, useful when discussing 
macroscopic situations but not a sufficient explainer of action. The powers of events themselves 
are then structural, governed by the agents therein, and the effects caused by events are the result 
only of agents. We see empowered agents partnering with other empowered agents to mutually 
manifest some effect, reducing events to empowered agents. The distinction between event and 
agent causation is in fact not a distinction at all, but a connection.  
Causal Structuralism   
We have claimed that properties drive causal power, but how does this occur? What in the nature 
of properties allows them to confer causal power? One view is Hawthorne’s “causal structuralism,” 
which argues that for each fundamental property, there is a causal profile that constitutes the 
individual essence of a property.
56
 Of note here is that this view does not hold that there is 
something to a property (Hawthorne calls it a ‘quiddity’) that is over and above its causal profile. 
The two key theses of causal structuralism are thus: “(i) That for any given natural property, there 
is some causal profile such that having that profile is sufficient for being that property and (ii) that 
for any given natural property, there is some causal profile such that having that profile is necessary 
for being that property” (Hawthorne 362).  
 
56
 For an in depth discussion of the matter, see “Causal Structuralism” in Philosophical Perspectives, 2001 
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 The strongest case for thinking that “the causal profile of a property exhausts its nature” is 
methodological: don’t invoke what you don’t need. We don’t need quidditative extras in order to 
understand our world. Take for example the negative charge of an electron—this is not something 
‘over and above’ the causal role it plays. All our definitions and knowledge about negative charge is 
essentially knowledge of its causal power. There is no additional thing or quiddity that is in fact 
“the thing that plays the charge role.” There is no need to invoke anything above and beyond what 
we already have and need: causal structure to fundamental properties.  
Reasons  
Returning to free agents, the question may be asked: what exactly does the agent cause? Under 
O’Connor’s construction, the agent causes an immediately executive, or action-triggering, 
intentional state. This intentional state is the agent’s “choice” as well as the agent’s basic action, 
which typically constitutes the initial segment of more extended causal processes that result from 
such choices. However, these explanations in terms of reasons are distinct from explanations in 
terms of causes. There is a relative strength (or ‘powerfulness’) to reasons, leading to a noncausal 
link between actions and the reasons explaining them. The agent recognizing a reason for her 
action seems to induce or elevate some kind of objective probability for the agent to cause some 
action. Agent causation is then probabilistically structured by the tendency-conferring states of 
having reasons to act and also more enduring character traits and long-standing general intentions. 
The agent is then the sole causal factor directly generating intentions to act but doing so is shaped 
causally by her total motivational state. The mere fact that she had a reason that gave her a 





 This and the following discussion of reasons comes from Timothy O’Connor’s article in The Oxford Handbook of 
Free Will, which is titled “Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories”  
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This reasons explanation is subject to Davidson’s challenge to noncausal reasons: among 
cases where the agent has more than one reason for performing an action, it is plausible to suppose 
that in some of them only one reason actually prompted the action, while in others a plurality of 
factors did so. In what does this difference consist?
58
 O’Connor answers the challenge in the 
following way: 
“I contend that a satisfactory answer to Davidson’s challenge requires…the agent 
causationist to suppose that agents cause executive states of intention of a particular sort. 
The content of these intentions is not merely that I perform an action of type ø, but that I 
perform an action of type ø in order to satisfy desire D (or prior intention I). If intentions 
have this rich sort of content, then the difference between acting to satisfy desire D1 and 
acting to satisfy D2 and acting to satisfy both, (sic) will be a function of the content of the 
intention that I cause to occur. When Davidson asks what accounts for my acting on reason 
R1 and not R2, given that I was aware of both at the time of acting, the answer will be that 
we must look to the content of the intention I cause; this will have the form, that I do A for 
in order to (sic) satisfy reason _____. In a given case, the blank will be filled by either or 
both of R1 and R2. In actively deciding which action I will undertake, I am inter alia 
deciding which reason I am aiming to satisfy.” (O’Connor 2002) 
Our Powerism ontology opens up another avenue of attack. We can think of reasons, or the 
having of reasons, as powers. My having a reason to eat lunch could be identified with my power to 
eat lunch intentionally. Then we might not need to posit an intervening mental state (the volition) 
at all. In addition, if I have several reasons, each for incompatible outcomes, then free choice 
consists in exercising one of these rational powers, to the exclusion of the others. The tie between 
the reason and the action is not an event-causal tie. Rather, it is a tie between a causal power and its 





 This challenge comes from Donald Davidson’s Essays on Actions and Events. 
59
 This idea comes from my supervisor, Dr. Robert Koons 
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 What about agents being mere conveyors of probabilities? Again, Powerism helps us here. 
We can understand the ‘probabilities’ of our reason states leading to some outcome as the 
powerfulness of these reasons. Strong reasons for action are the ‘high probability’ reasons, and 
weaker reasons for action are the ‘low probability’ reasons. The powerfulness of these can be 
thought of as the magnitude of the vectors from our vector addition model, with room for reasons 
to themselves be indeterministic. Since these reasons do not necessitate action, the free agent is 
able to choose freely from them—while these reasons have power, they do not determine the 
outflowing of the agent, and the agent is no longer just a conveyor of probabilities.  
Responsibility  
To conclude this discussion, we turn to Strawson’s (1984: ch. 2, 1994) objection to indeterministic 
theories of free action in general. He argues that they unwittingly entail an infinite regress at every 
locus of indeterministic choice of course of action. The way one acts in this view is explained by 
“how one is, mentally speaking” (M), so for the agent to be responsible for how they act the agent 
must also be responsible for M. To be responsible for M, the agent must have chosen to be M 
deliberately in accordance with reason R1. For this choice to incur responsibility, the agent must 
also choose to be moved by R1, requiring a further reason R2, and so on ad infinitum. In other 
words, “free choice requires an impossible regress of choices to be the way one is in making 
choices” (O’Connor 2002).  
 How are we to respond to this? To have any sort of responsibility, the free will theorist 
must have some idea of how the agent is in rational control (and is aware of this control) over the 
choices she makes when there are no conditions that remove freedom from the equation. For 
agent causationists who argue free control over action resides solely in the causal efficacy of the 
agent’s reasons, it makes sense to worry about how those reasons came about in the first place. On 
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the agent-causal account established, the agent causes an ‘action initiating intention’ to A for reason 
R1, which is then explained by the agent being aware of reason R1 while deliberating and 
completing the action. The agent is simply in this state, among others, and then deliberates 
accordingly. The range of possibilities for actions the agent can take is circumscribed by the sum 
total of the reason-states as well as some idea of the scope of responsibilities that would be incurred 
as a direct result of the action. But this choice was not fully causally determined by nor some 
probabilistic outcome of those states. Instead, the choice was directly determined by the agent, a 
choice which can be explained by the reason states or M but not a full result of those states. The 
choice was made for certain reasons, but the agent is not constrained by these reasons, and thus 
there is no need for the agent to have chosen these reasons in the first place.  
 This hints at an important concern. At birth, we have a number of deep behavioral and 
attitudinal dispositions, and as we develop we are placed in environments which shape us without 
any rational choice on our end at how we got there. These dispositions constitute many of our 
long-term reasons for action, even if nature and nurture do not completely causally determine 
these ideas. They absolutely influence the range of choices available to the agent: the choices faced 
by Timmy in a free situation can be substantially different from the choices faced by Todd in the 
same situation. These contingencies then circumscribe the options available to Timmy upon 
reflection, which leads into us holding Timmy accountable for his actions. If these factors, 
unchosen by Timmy, play a large role in his mature choices even in an agent-causal frame, is 
autonomy enough? 
 Of course, the agent-causationist can concede that responsibility for character development 
and the choices that thereby ensue comes in stages and holding Timmy responsible for a choice 
that is totally out of his wheelhouse or scope of understanding is ridiculous. Similarly, passing on 
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choices within his range but given limited opportunity to consider can have some degree of 
reduced responsibility. Immoral actions to one agent may be the only options available to another. 
Was there any point in the immoral agent’s life where more moral paths were open? If those paths 
were taken, would they have led her to the same position today? Our understanding about these 
matters is rough at best, and in an indeterministic, non-necessitating world of action, we deem 
moral judgement appropriate.  
 The agent causationist must allow for the existence of agents whose basic decision-making 
capacities are just the same as others yet they lack the moral sensitivity to common human decency 
through no fault of their own. The AC theorist can also accept that any idea of perfect 
responsibility for one’s choices, character, and constitution is “not just contingently lacking in 
humans but is impossible” (O’Connor, 2002). Perfect responsibility would require rational 
detachment and indifference from the outset or complete openness to all possible courses of 
action. Calling such an idea coherent is doubtful.   
There is a final question to be asked: has this done anything for the debate on free will? 
While this is far from the definitive word on the matter, what we have done here is establish a 
viable ontological framework from which free will may emerge. Powerism has expanded upon 
agent causation such that we have denied event causation and all of its ontological conclusions, as 
well as answering issues of wayward causal chains and probabilistic causation. Have we found free 
will? I am inclined to believe that these theories about causation, agency, and powers have serious 
merit, so while there is still much discussion to be had on our ontology, I believe we have provided 
an avenue by which we can indeed find free will. If these are the paths we are walking, we will 
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